...So no Dave actually independently generated the decision to go back and warn himself about the left-on oven. That decision was always predicated on his experience, in the past, of himself coming back and warning him to do it — and by extension, defining his future such that he, too, will have to go back and satisfy that condition when he reaches that future point.
...One moment.
For ease of comprehension, I'm going to examine the timeline only up until the point when the Future Dave appears. Tell me if I have this correct.
Effectively, the universe has dictated that at this definite point in its timeline, a Future Dave will appear to the Dave of that present moment and warn him of the oven. There will always be a Dave. There will always be an oven. There will always be a prevented fire.
But by definition it cannot have been any Dave's DECISION to go back and prevent the oven fire, because rendering a decision at all would involve the possibility of a divergent universe. On the contrary, the universe simply stipulates that a Dave must appear from the future at this point in time — leaving you, the Dave of the present, to satisfy that condition at some point after you've proceeded beyond that point in time in the overall timestream.
...Does it not follow, then, that no Dave can be said to have free will?
no subject
...One moment.
For ease of comprehension, I'm going to examine the timeline only up until the point when the Future Dave appears. Tell me if I have this correct.
Effectively, the universe has dictated that at this definite point in its timeline, a Future Dave will appear to the Dave of that present moment and warn him of the oven. There will always be a Dave. There will always be an oven. There will always be a prevented fire.
But by definition it cannot have been any Dave's DECISION to go back and prevent the oven fire, because rendering a decision at all would involve the possibility of a divergent universe. On the contrary, the universe simply stipulates that a Dave must appear from the future at this point in time — leaving you, the Dave of the present, to satisfy that condition at some point after you've proceeded beyond that point in time in the overall timestream.
...Does it not follow, then, that no Dave can be said to have free will?